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Abstract 
The allocation of scarce public resources such as transplant organs and limited 
public funding involves a tradeoff between equality— equal access, and efficiency—
maximizing total benefit. The current research explores how preferences shift when 
allocation decisions involve human lives versus when they do not.  Fifteen experiments 
test this question using a variety of allocation scenarios, including allocation of life-
saving medical aid, money, road construction, vaccines, and other resources. The results 
consistently show an increased preference for efficiency when the allocation involves 
saving human lives, and equality when the allocation involves outcomes with other 
consequences. We found no preference shift when stakes were manipulated in allocations 
where lives were not on the line, suggesting that the effect cannot be explained by life-
saving resources simply being higher stakes. These findings suggest a unique preference 
for efficiency for allocations involving life-and-death consequences that has implications 
for designing and conveying public resource allocation policies.  
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Efficiency for lives, equality for everything else: 
How allocation preference shifts across domains 
When distributing scarce resources, there is often a tradeoff between equality, 
giving beneficiaries equal access, and efficiency, maximizing the total benefit achieved. 
For instance, disaster relief funds might be allocated to all victims equally, or 
preferentially to those who can put them to the best use. Organ transplant lists can use a 
first-come, first-served rule to ensure equal access, or prioritize younger, healthier 
patients to increase total life-years saved. How does the public view these tradeoffs? Do 
they prefer equality or efficiency?  
An extensive literature exists on people’s preferences between efficiency and 
equality in the economic domain (for a review see Gordon-Hecker, Chosen-Hillel, Shalvi 
& Bereby-Meyer, 2017), but we know very little about how allocation preferences may 
differ across domains. Specifically, no research has examined whether people hold 
different allocation preferences for life-saving resources versus other types of resources. 
The current research, we explore the answer to this question.   
Research in the healthcare context suggests that the public prefers equality to 
efficiency when allocating scarce medical resources. For example, 56% of jurors in one 
study preferred to allocate screening tests to all Medicaid recipients despite the cost of 
saving fewer lives in total (Ubel, DeKay, Baron & Asch, 1996). In another study (Ubel & 
Lowenstein, 1996), the majority of participants did not allocate all transplant livers to 
children with higher chances of survival. However, the proportion of choices favoring 
equality over efficiency varies across studies and does not always represent the majority 
(Ubel et al, 1996; Ubel & Lowenstein, 1996). Other studies in the healthcare context 
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show that such preferences are malleable and subject to framing effects (Colby, DeWitt, 
& Chapman, 2015; Li & DeWitt, 2017; Li, Vietri, Galvani, & Chapman, 2010; Ubel, 
Baron, & Asch, 2001).  
Outside of the healthcare context, research on allocation preference has focused 
primarily on money allocation. In the organizational setting, research shows that in 
general, monetary resources prompt preferences for differential, and potentially more 
efficient allocations (Conlon, Porter, & Parks, 2004; DeVoe & Iyengar, 2010; Martin & 
Harder, 1994; Tornblom & Foa, 1983). This indicates a general preference for efficiency 
over equality in monetary allocations.  
Thus, existing evidence seems to indicate a general preference for equality in 
allocations involving lives, and a preference for efficiency in allocations involving 
money. But given that such evidence comes from different lines of literature, these 
findings are not directly comparable.  
Thus, we propose Hypothesis 1: The public’s allocation preference shifts towards 
equality in allocations involving human lives versus allocations involving money. This 
comparison is narrow. After observing results from two studies, we formed a broader 
Hypothesis 2: The public allocation preference shifts towards efficiency in allocations 
involving human lives versus those involving non-lives in general. 
Study 1 compared allocation of life-saving resources to the allocation of money; 
Study 2 compared allocation of life-saving resources to the allocation of highway 
restoration resources. Results from these studies led us to propose and test Hypothesis 2. 
Study 3 explored how allocation preferences shift when lives are on the line versus when 
the same resource is being allocated but lives are not on the line; Studies 4 and 5 explored 
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stakes as an alternative explanation for the different allocation preferences between lives 
and non-lives, with Study 4 testing the effect of the numerical magnitude of consequence, 
and Study 5.1-5.11 testing the effect of different types of stakes outside of life-and-death 
situations. 
Study 1 
Study 1 tested how allocation preference varies between allocations involving 
lives and money.  
Methods 
 As no prior research has compared allocation preference involving lives and 
money, we chose large sample sizes to ensure the power of our studies, with about n = 
200 per condition in all studies. In Study 1, 417 participants from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk completed the online study for a small payment. Participants imagined that they 
worked for a government aid program and needed to allocate a limited pool of resources 
between two groups of people following a severe earthquake. Participants were randomly 
assigned to a “money” condition in which the aid was money or a “lives” condition in 
which the aid was life saving humanitarian resources. In both conditions, participants 
read that Group A is located in an easier-to-access location and therefore is more 
successful at translating the resource into a greater benefit than Group B.  
Participants then saw six potential allocation plans depicted as pie charts with 
different colors representing benefits in each group and a gap representing “benefit that 
was not received due to operating cost” / “lives that are not saved due to the extra hurdles 
of operation” (see Figure 1). We designed the 6 plans such that each successive plan 
decreased the benefit to Group A by $20 Million (20 lives) and increased the benefit to 
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Group B by $10 Million (10 lives), leading to a decrease of overall benefit by $10 
Million (10 lives). We explained the tradeoff and pointed out that Plan 1 achieves 
efficiency the best, while Plan 6 achieves equality the best (see Supplemental Materials 
for details). 
We measure preference as the choice among the six plans (1= most efficient, 6 = 
most equal), and administered two comprehension check questions on which plan was 
most efficient and which was most equal. Participants also answered and four additional 
perception questions. See supplemental materials for description and results related to 
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Figure 1. Allocation plans displayed in pie charts in the Money condition (A) and Lives 
condition (B) in Study 1. Legends accompany pie charts in the Money condition read 
“Red: Benefit (in Million $) received by people in Group A. Blue: Benefit (in Million $) 
received by people in Group B. White gap: Benefit that is not received due to the extra 
cost of operation.” Legends accompanying pie charts in the Lives condition included 
“Red: Lives saved in Group A. Blue: Lives saved in Group B.  White gap: Lives that are 
not saved due to the extra hurdles of operation.” 
Results 
Of 417 participants, 74% of participants correctly answered both check questions. 
We performed all analyses twice, once only including these participants and once 
including all participants. These analyses led to the same conclusions (see supplemental 
materials for details) and below we present analyses including all participants.  
Contrary to Hypothesis 1, participants showed greater preference for efficiency in 
the Lives condition (M = 3.25, SD = 1.97) than the Money condition, (M = 4.54, SD = 
1.53), t (415) = 7.37, p < .001, Mean Diff  = 1.28, 95% CI [0.94, 1.62], Cohen’s D = 
0.72. Figure 2 shows the percentage of participants choosing each allocation plan by 
B 
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condition.. Treating the preference measure as an ordinal variable yielded the same 
conclusion (see Supplemental Materials).  
 
Figure 2. Percentages of participants choosing each plan in the “Money” and “Lives” 
conditions in Study 1. Plan 1 was the most efficient and to Plan 6 was the most equal 
plan, with plans in between ranging from efficient to equal in equal intervals.  
Discussion 
 These results demonstrate that when efficiency and equality pose a conflict in the 
allocation of scarce public resources, people’s preference for efficiency is greater when 
the allocation involves lives compared to when it involves money. This result is in the 
opposite direction of what Hypothesis 1 predicted, but may not be directly contradictory 
to existing research due to the different ways the studies that were conducted. We offer a 
more lengthy discussion in the general discussion. We replicated these findings in a 
similar study where money was used for poverty relief instead of disaster relief (Study 




























Plan 6 (most equal)
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Study 2 
 Does the effect in Study 1 extend to situations where monetary resource leads to 
non-monetary outcomes? This is a practical policy question, as monetary resources can 
achieve non-monetary outcomes such as infrastructural or educational improvements. 
Study 2 answers this question by comparing two allocations of the same “aid resources” 
that either saves lives or repairs highways.  
Methods 
Four hundred and fifty-eight participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk were 
randomly assigned to either a “Highway” or “Lives” condition in an online study. Both 
conditions used an earthquake relief scenario similar to Study 1, and participants were 
asked to allocate aid between City A or City B. The resource in both conditions was 
described as government “humanitarian aid”. The “Lives” condition was similar to that 
used in Study 1. However, the “Highway condition” described the outcomes of the 
allocation in the miles of highways repaired. As in Study 1, City A is more accessible 
than City B, but Study 2 made it more explicit that because of this, City B required more 
resources to produce each unit of benefit. 
To allow a more precise measure of allocation preference, we measured allocation 
using a slider bar that was lined to an interactive pie-chart showing the composition of 
benefit received in each city in response to the sliding bar (Figure 3). The tradeoff was 
similar to Study 1, where it costs 1 unit of resource to generate 1 unit of benefit in City A, 
and 2 units of resource to generate 1 unit of benefit in City B.  The benefit in both 
conditions ranged from 0 lives saved or miles repaired to 150 lives saved or 150 miles 
repaired. The outcome measure was the amount of benefit allocated to City A, where 
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greater number indicates greater preference for efficiency (See Supplemental Materials 
for additional procedural details as well as additional measures collected in this study).  
 
 
Figure 3. Screen shot of the slider bars and interactive pie chart used in Study 2 to 
measure allocation preference. The graph shows the initial image of the pie chart and 
initial location of the slider bars in the “Highway” condition. 
Results 
Nineteen out of 458 participants (4.1%) chose to allocate more benefit to City B 
than to City A, leading to outcomes that were neither efficient nor equal. Results were 
similar in analyses including and excluding these participants (see Supplemental 
Materials) and we present the analysis including all participants below.  
Figure 4 shows the mean units of benefit allocated to City A in the two 
conditions. Participants allocated more resources to city A and thus allocated them more 
efficiently in the “Lives” condition (M = 113.69, SD = 36.80) compared to the 
“Highway” condition (M = 90.39, SD = 34.64), Mean Diff = 23.30, 95% CI [16.74, 
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29.86], t (456) = 6.98, p < .001, Cohen’s D = 0.65. Thus, participants demonstrated a 
greater preference for efficiency when the allocation involved lives than when it involved 
highway repairs. 
 
Figure 4. Mean units of benefits allocated to City A in the “Highway” and “Lives” 
condition in Study 2. Greater values indicate greater preference for efficiency. Error bars: 
±2 Standard Errors.   
Discussion 
 Study 2 extended the findings from Study 1, and showed that people demonstrate 
greater preference for efficiency when the allocation consequence was lives compared to 
highway repairs. We replicated these findings in a similar study where choices were 
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In Study 2, the resource being allocated in both condition was described the same 
way as “humanitarian aid” but differed whether the consequence of allocation involved 
lives or highway repairs. If people prefer greater efficiency when the allocation 
consequence was lives being saved vs. highways being repaired, would they demonstrate 
a similar preference shift when the allocation consequence is lives being saved vs. 
something else that is not lives? This leads us to propose Hypothesis 2: The public shows 
greater preference for efficiency in allocations where lives are on the line compared to 
allocations where lives are not on the line. 
To test Hypothesis 2, Study 3 manipulates the consequence of allocating the same 
medical resource, so that it involves either life-and-death consequences or mild health 
symptoms. This allows us to test two different consequences (saving human lives vs. 
relieving mild health symptoms) in the same general domain of health.  In addition, most 
research in medical resource allocation has used scenarios involving human lives, such as 
the allocation of organs, life-saving vaccines, or cancer-screening tests (et al, 2015; Li et 
al., 2010; Li & Dewitt, 2017; Ubel et al, 1996; Ubel & Lowenstein, 1996; Colby), leaving 
a gap in our understanding of allocation preference in the medical domain when lives are 
not on the line. Study 3 will help fill this gap. 
We used a hypothetical vaccine against the Zika virus, and conducted the study in 
June 2016, when an outbreak of Zika virus was ongoing in South American and posed an 
imminent danger of spreading to the U.S. (Stamm & Cameron, 2016).   
Methods 
 Four hundred and fifteen participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk completed 
the study for a small payment. All participants were given basic facts about Zika adapted 
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from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, including that infection of Zika 
virus can cause mild symptoms among the general population, but can cause birth defects 
among pregnant women that could be life-threatening to the infant. Participants were 
randomly assigned to either a “mild symptom” condition (vaccines for the general 
population to prevent mild symptoms) or a “birth defect” condition (vaccines for 
pregnant women to prevent birth defects). Participants imagined that they needed to 
allocate the first batch of a limited supply of the vaccine to two cities. They were told that 
because the mosquito species in City B carried a larger amount of Zika virus than the 
mosquito species in City A, it required two doses to vaccinate one person in City B, while 
one dose was sufficient per person in City A; thus, allocating more vaccines to City A 
results in more people being vaccinated, but would be less equal (see Supplemental 
Materials for complete materials).  
 Participants indicated their allocation preference by moving the sliding bars 
linked to an interactive pie chart similar to that used in Study 2, which showed the 
number of recipients of the vaccine in each city. Additional measures are described in the 
Supplemental Materials. 
Results 
Thirty-seven of 415 participants (8.9%) allocated the vaccines in a way that were 
neither efficient nor equal (more people vaccinated in City B than in City A). Results 
were similar in analyses including and excluding these participants (see Supplemental 
Materials) and we present the analysis including all participants below.  
 As shown in Figure 5, the number of people receiving the vaccine in City A, 
which served as an index for efficiency, was significantly higher in the birth defect 
EFFICIENCY FOR LIVES 14
condition than in the mild symptom condition, M = 428.85 (SD = 161.92) vs. 380.95 (SD 
= 157.86), t (413) = 3.05, Mean Diff = 47.89, 95% CI [17.02, 78.76], p = .002, Cohen’s 
D = 0.30.  
  
Figure 5. Mean numbers of individuals to receive vaccination in City A as indicated by 
participants in the “Mild Symptom” and “Birth Defect” condition in Study 3. Greater 
values indicate greater preference for efficiency. Error bars: ±2 Standard Errors.  
Discussion 
 In Study 3 we directly manipulated the consequence of allocating the same 
resource and showed that people prefer more efficient allocations when the consequence 
is life-threatening compared to mild. We also replicated the findings in a similar study 
(Study S3) where the vaccine only prevents symptoms of the infection but does not 
prevent transmission to others, thereby eliminating potential considerations for the 
societal effect of vaccination beyond the direct health consequences we intended to 
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Results from the studies so far support Hypothesis 2, that is, people demonstrate a 
unique preference for efficiency in allocations involving lives compared to allocations 
involving other consequences. However, life-and-death consequences arguably constitute 
higher stakes than other consequences. Thus, the results obtained so far could reflect a 
general preference towards greater efficiency when the stakes involved are high (lives) 
compared to low (non-lives), rather than a unique perceptions and preferences related to 
life-saving allocations.  
To explore whether stakes can explain for the effects observed so far, Study 4 
manipulates the magnitude of stakes. We manipulated numerical magnitude as it serves 
as a clean manipulation of stakes. At the same time, we also manipulated domain (lives 
vs. money) of the outcomes as in Study 1. If the greater preference for efficiency we have 
observed so far is due to the greater stakes involved in life-or-death situations, both high 
magnitude and the lives condition should lead to greater preference for efficiency, 
compared to low magnitude and the money condition.  
Alternatively, magnitude may produce an opposite effect on allocation preference 
due to distorted perceptions. Prospect Theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1979) indicates 
that people evaluate gains and losses relative to the reference point and derive 
diminishing marginal utility as the magnitude of gain increases. For example, people may 
perceive greater utility from 10 units of gain twice (e.g. saving 10 lives in each of two 
cities) than from 21 units of gain once (e.g. saving 21 lives in one city), and therefore 
prefer to spread the benefit between two cities (equality). Because diminishing marginal 
utility becomes more pronounced as magnitude increases, the preference for equality may 
increase as the magnitude of outcome increases.  
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Study 4 tests the opposing predictions outlined above. Study 4 used a simplified 
scenario and described the cost of inefficient allocations in a more neutral fashion than 
was used in Studies 1-3, using text instead of pie charts with white spaces or “waste” on 
prominently marked.  This paradigm is potentially more realistic, as real-world allocation 
problems often do not explicitly present the exact numerical cost of efficiency.   
Method.  
 Pre-registration. We pre-registered the study on aspredicted.org on July 31, 2017 
and collected data on Aug 7, 2017 (see https://aspredicted.org/6s2y7.pdf for pre-
registration and supplemental materials for original data) through Amazon Mechanical 
Turk with a target of 800 participants, and received responses from 810 participants.  
 Questionnaire. The study used a 2 (Between-subject: Resource type—money vs. 
lives) × 7 (Within-subject: Magnitude—1 to 1 million) semi-factorial mixed design, 
where each participant was randomly assigned 3 of the 7 magnitude levels to prevent 
fatigue, leading to approximately 170 participants exposed to each magnitude level per 
resource type. In the money condition, participants were asked to imagine a scenario 
where limited monetary resources must be distributed to people in need, and that 
delivering $1 of aid to Group B incurs $1of additional cost, whereas delivering the same 
aid to Group A incurs no additional cost. In the lives conditions participants were asked 
to allocate limited “humanitarian aid” in a similar scenario where benefits were indicated 
in lives saved. The numbers varied across 7 magnitude levels in either dollars received or 
lives saved (1; 10; 100; 1,000; 10,000; 100,000; 1,000,000). Participants were presented 3 
pairs of outcomes in text, one outcome more efficient and one outcome more equal. 
Responses were recorded as 0-100 on a sliding bar, with higher scores indicating 
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preference for the efficient allocation. Participants also completed two comprehension 
check questions. See supplemental materials for original questionnaire. 
Results.  
 Among all 810 participants 87.2% answered both attention check questions 
correctly. We performed all analyses twice with both yielding similar results. We present 
the analyses including all participants below, (see Supplemental Materials for the 
additional analyses). 
 We used hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to appropriately handle the 
repeated-measures aspect of the design (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). The HLM analysis 
used preference as the dependent variable, and treated within-subject responses as Level 
1 units and subject as Level 2 units. We used the continuous variable Magnitude (1-7, 
mean-centered) as the Level 1 predictor, Resource Type (-0.5 money, 0.5 lives) as the 
Level 2 predictor, and tested the fixed effect of both predictors as well as their interaction 
in the HLM model. The model also tested the random effects of intercept and magnitude 
across subjects, and defined covariance type as unstructured, which yielded better fit than 
other variance structures; random effects were retained in the model if including them 
yielded better model fit based on chi-square comparisons of -2 Restricted Log 
Likelihoods. The final model was run using restricted likelihood method (REML).  
 The results showed greater preference for efficiency in the lives condition than in 
the money condition, B = 22.66, 95% CI [18.12, 27.19], p < .001. Contrary to both of the 
expectations discussed earlier regarding magnitude, however, magnitude had no effect, B 
= -0.05, 95% CI [-0.50, 0.39], p = .82, nor was there an interaction between magnitude 
and resource type, B = 0.46, 95% CI [-0.43, 1.35], p = .31. Random effect of the Intercept 
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Var (μ0) = 1008.49, and random effect of magnitude Var (μ1) = 18.53 indicate wide 
variations across participants both on mean preference rating and how magnitude affects 
preference. Figure 6 illustrates the raw mean preference ratings. 
 
Figure 6. Mean preference between equal outcome and efficient outcome at different 
levels of magnitude in the lives and money conditions in Study 4. Greater values indicate 
greater preference for efficiency. Error bars: ±2 Standard Errors.  
Discussion 
 Study 4 replicated the finding that allocation preferences differ between 
allocations involving lives and those not involving lives. More importantly, we found that 
such preference was not influenced by the magnitude of outcomes. The lack of magnitude 
effect is contrary to expectations based on the conceptualization that stakes influence 
allocation preference, or the decreasing marginal utility of gains. This finding undermines 
stakes as an alternative explanation to the preference differences observed so far between 











































EFFICIENCY FOR LIVES 19
There are other interpretations for the null effect of magnitude.  For one, 
magnitude may not have altered perceived stakes sufficiently. The embedding effect 
shows that people would give similar dollar amounts when they are asked how much they 
were willing to pay to save 2000 versus 200,000 wild birds (Desvousges et al. Wilson, 
1993). Thus, it is possible that people may not have perceived much difference between 
the scenarios at the different levels of magnitude. Alternatively, the opposing effects of 
stakes and diminishing marginal utility of magnitude may have canceled each other out.  
Study 5 
Even if magnitude of stakes does not affect allocation preference, it is still 
possible that people’s perceived level of stakes rests largely on the type of stakes. To 
further test the role of stakes in allocation preference, we conducted a series of eleven 
experiments (Study 5.1-5.11) using a variety of scenarios that do not directly involve life-
and-death outcomes, and manipulated stakes the type instead of magnitude of stakes. We 
grouped them together because of the similar methods. If the preference differences we 
observed so far are due to the higher stakes in life-and-death situations compared to other 
situations, we would also expect allocations with higher stakes to shift preference 
towards efficiency compared to lower stakes, even when lives are not on the line.  
Method.  
 Pre-registration. We pre-registered one sub-study (Study 5.9) on aspredicted.org 
on Oct 20, 2017, and collected data on Oct 26, 2017 (see 
https://aspredicted.org/vx6v9.pdf for pre-registration) through Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
The other studies were not pre-registered, as they were considered exploratory studies.  
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 Questionnaire. Studies 5.1-5.11 all used a between-subjects comparison of high-
stakes and low-stakes allocations (where either pretesting or manipulation checks showed 
differential levels of stakes) but differed on the allocation scenarios used and the 
population from which we recruited participants (Table 1). In all studies participants 
indicated allocation preference between two potential outcomes. Outcome 1:  3,000 (units 
of benefits) to Group A and 0 to Group B or Outcome 2: 1,000 (units of benefits) to 
Group A 1,000 (units of benefits) to Group B. We measured preferences between these 
two outcomes using a 1-7 scale in Studies 5.3 and 5.4, and a 0-100 point slider bar in 
other studies, with higher scores always representing preference for the efficient 
outcome. 
 The manipulation of stakes was implemented in two different ways to increase the 
validity of the overall finding (Table 1). Six studies used different types of resources 
expected to have different levels of stakes, contrasting drinking water (high stakes) to 
coffee (low stakes), water, food, and vaccines to books, deodorants, and sunglasses, and 
road repair to cell phone chargers; Five studies held the resource constant and directly 
manipulated stakes in the consequence, contrasting fiction books that helps improve 
literacy and in turn job prospects (high stakes) to fiction books that are nice to have (low 
stakes), or sunglasses that prevent blindness to sunglasses that are nice to have. (See 
supplemental materials for original scenarios).  Stakes was manipulated between 2 
conditions in all studies except in Study 5.2, where we compared 3 high-stakes between-
subject conditions (water, food, vaccines) to 3 low-stakes between-subject conditions 
(fiction books, deodorants, sunglasses) using a planned contrast. 
Table 1. Features of Studies 5.1-5.11. 
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Water (unit-drink)  Coffee Mturk 404 




5.3 Wild fire Water (unit-drink) Coffee (unit-drink) Mturk 150 
5.4 Wild fire Water (unit-person) Coffee (unit-person) Mturk 153 




Sunglasses-nice to have Mturk 152 




Sunglasses-nice to have College 124 








Road repair Phone charger  Mturk 256 
Note: * pre-registered study. 
Results. 
In each study, we conducted a t-test (or a contrast in the case of Study 5.2) on 
preference for efficiency in the high versus low stakes conditions, and computed a raw 
effect size as measured by Cohen’s D, with positive values indicating greater preference 
for efficiency in the high stakes condition than the low stakes condition, and negative 
values indicating greater preference for efficiency in the low stakes condition than the 
high stakes condition. Figure 7 shows the weighted effect size plot for each study.  
In the 4 studies comparing water to coffee in a disaster scenario, 2 studies showed 
a non-significant positive effect (Studies 5.3 & 5.4) and 2 showed a non-significant 
negative effect (Studies 5.1 & 5.10). The study comparing water, food, and vaccines to 
books, deodorants, and sunglasses (Study 5.2) showed a non-significant positive effect. 
The study comparing road repair to cell phone chargers (Study 5.11) showed a non-
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significant negative effect. In the 3 studies comparing books for literacy to books that 
were “nice to have”, 1 study showed a significant positive effect (Study 5.5), 1 study 
showed a non-significant positive effect (Study 5.9) while the third study showed a non-
significant negative effect (Study 5.7). In the 2 studies comparing sunglasses to prevent 
blindness vs. sunglasses that were “nice to have”, 1 study showed a non-significant 
positive effect (Study 5.8) while the other showed a non-significant negative effect 
(Study 5.6).  
In total, 5 studies showed a non-significant positive effect, 5 studies showed a 
non-significant negative effect, and only one study – Study 5.5 showed a significant 
preference for allocating more efficiently under high stakes than low stakes, though that 
result would not be significant if we adjusted the significance level to take into account 
the multiple studies. Moreover, a meta-analysis of these 11 studies shows an overall 
effect that is indistinguishable from zero: d = .03, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.10].   
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Figure 7. Weighted effect sizes, 95% Confidence Intervals, and resources in the high vs. 
low stakes conditions in Studies 5.1-5.11, with Study 0 and the solid vertical line the 
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Books for literacy vs. books 
nice to have
Water vs. coffee
Sunglasses to prevent blindness 
vs. sunglasses nice to have
Sunglasses to prevent blindness 
vs. sunglasses nice to have
Road repair vs. cell 
phone charger
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 Studies 5.1-5.11 indicate that the type stakes involved in the decision does not 
influence people’s allocation preferences when lives are not on the line, which suggests 
that there is something special about the allocation of resources that are considered life-
saving compared to all other resources. 
General Discussion 
The tradeoff between efficiency and equality is inevitable in many situations of 
scarcity. Past research provides some evidence that preferences for efficiency versus 
equality vary across contexts. We conducted 15 studies (with three additional replications 
Studies S1-S3 described in the Supplemental Materials) and found a consistent pattern: 
People demonstrate increased concerns for efficiency when lives are involved in the 
allocation decision, compared to when lives are not involved. In addition, we demonstrate 
that the level of stakes (both magnitude and type) does not influence allocation 
preference beyond the comparison between lives and other consequences.   
In Studies 1 and 4, people demonstrated an increased preference for efficiency 
when allocating lives vs. money. This finding may seem to contradict past research that 
highlights the concern for equality in medical allocations (Ubel et al., 1996; Ubel & 
Loewenstein, 1996) and a dominant concern for efficiency in monetary allocation 
(DeVoe & Iyengar, 2010; Martin & Harder, 1994; Tornblom & Foa, 1983). It is possible 
that the design differences between our “lives” scenarios and previous research in 
medical resource allocation contributed to such difference. For example, studies by Ubel 
and colleagues (Ubel et al., 1996; Ubel & Loewenstein, 1996) involved well-specified 
beneficiaries (e.g., Medicaid recipients) who reap differential benefits from the same 
resource, but the the cost of equal allocation was not salient. In contrast, our “lives” 
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scenarios involved abstract groups such as “Group A/B” who cost differential amounts of 
resources for the same benefit, and many of our studies made the cost of equal allocations 
salient as in “number of lives not saved”. In addition, while our money allocation 
scenarios involve public money, previous research on monetary allocation comes from 
the organizational setting, where the prevailing preference tends to be equity-based, that 
is, allocating rewards in proportion to contribution (Bazerman, White, & Loewenstein, 
1995; Hochschild, 1981). It is possible that allocation preferences may vary between the 
private and public sector, especially given that social goals are more associated with 
equality preferences (e.g. Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996). 
Studies 2-4 indicate that people display a robust preference for efficiency in 
allocations involving lives compared to those that do not. Studies 4 and 5.1-5.11 found 
that stakes cannot explain this preference shift.  What, then, accounts for this effect if 
stakes cannot explain it? The preference for equality is a strong social norm in American 
society, often acting as a heuristic when allocating resources between self and others 
(Messick, 1993). This suggests that for efficiency to be considered, people need to 
engage additional cognitive processes to move away from the equality heuristic. When 
the resource is scarce and the allocation has life-and-death consequences, the allocation 
becomes a tragic tradeoff between different lives. Past research on the sacred-values-
protection model indicates that when faced with tragic tradeoffs, people expect an ethical 
decision maker to take a long time to deliberate (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green & Lerner, 
2000). Potentially, if participants take longer to deliberate when making allocations 
involving lives, it should allow a more deliberative processes to influence the decision, 
which in turn would allow the decision maker to move away from a fast, heuristics-based 
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decision that favors equality. This mechanism for the current results constitutes an 
avenue for future research. 
 The current research has important policy implications. Our findings indicate that 
the public may be willing to sacrifice equality for efficiency when allocating transplant 
organs, new vaccines in deadly pandemics, or cancer screening tests, but may be reluctant 
to do so when allocating funds for education, infrastructure, or health resources that 
improve the quality of life. These preferences may present a difficult problem for policy 
makers, because multiple public resources can ultimately draw on the same pool of tax 
revenue when policy decisions are made at the highest level. However, understanding 
such preferences will equip policymakers with the ability to forecast public reactions to 
policy changes more accurately. In addition, policymakers may use this knowledge to 
significant advantage in garnering public support. For instance, these findings suggest 
that when trying to overcome opposition to an efficient resource allocation strategy, a 
policy maker may emphasize that such allocations will ultimately affect the life and death 
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